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I. INTRODUCTION
The buying, selling, and regulation of interests in property has generated as
much litigation in Hawai'i over the past two decades as it had in the previous
forty years. Little of economic consequence occurs in the state without
affecting land.' As a result, although Hawai'i remains on the whole non-
litigious, legal disputes about land continue to arise, often raising fundamental
constitutional issues, but also frequently dealing with the mundane. Into the
first category fall disputes concerning property taken under the state's power of
eminent domain (triggering constitutional analyses on public use,
compensation, and regulatory takings) and state constitutional guarantees of
Native Hawaiian traditional and customary rights; into the second category fall
condominium or homeowner association disputes.
In deciding the dozens of cases in these categories, the state supreme court
over which retired Chief Justice Moon presided rendered decisions in which
some trends are readily discernible. First, the court resumed a practice arguably
commenced during the Richardson years (but interrupted during the Lum
Court)2 of deciding a handful of important cases on grounds neither briefed nor
argued by the parties. The Richardson Court did so in both Robinson v.
Ariyoshi3 and (arguably) County ofKauai v. Pacific Standard Life Insurance
Co. (Nukolii),4 while the Moon court did so in Public Access Shoreline Hawaii
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v. Hawai'i County Planning Commission (PASH).s In at least two such cases,
the court denied motions for rehearing so the parties could brief and argue
issues presented by that new ground. Second, the Moon Court decided some of
the state's most important property and related environmental and Native
Hawaiian rights cases in favor of the various non-governmental organizations
bringing them (Sierra Club, Earthjustice, Hawaii's Thousand Friends, and the
Native Hawaiian Legal Corporation) approximately eighty-two percent of the
time,6 sixty-five percent of which reversed the Intermediate Court of Appeals
' 79 Haw. 425, 903 P.2d 1246 (1995).
6 This percentage was calculated from important land use and property cases, in which
there was a clear interest by either a developer or environmental group. See Maunalua Bay
Beach Ohana 28 v. State, No. 28175,2010 WL 2329366,2010 Haw. LEXIS 119 (June 9,2010)
(denying certiorari to private landowners' inverse condemnation claim for the loss of a property
interest in existing accretions to shoreline property); Unite Here! Local 5 v. City & Cnty. of
Honolulu (Turtle Bay), 123 Haw. 150, 231 P.3d 423 (2010) (holding that the timing of
development could constitute a substantial change requiring a new environmental impact
statement); Save Diamond Head Waters LLC v. Hans Hedemann Surf, Inc., 121 Haw. 16,211
P.3d 74 (2009) (holding that a beach equipment rental store was not a valid prior
nonconforming use); Sierra Club v. Dep't of Transp. (Superferry l), 120 Haw. 181, 202 P.3d
1226 (2009) (holding that a special session act authorizing immediate commencement of an
interisland ferry was unconstitutional); Cnty. of Hawai'i v. C & J Coupe Family Ltd. P'ship
(Coupe 1), 119 Haw. 352, 198 P.3d 615 (2008) (holding that a bypass road did not qualify as a
public purpose and that the county impermissibly used its eminent domain authority); Brescia v.
N. Shore Ohana, 115 Haw. 477, 168 P.3d 929 (2007) (holding the larger shoreline setback
applicable); Kelly v. 1250 Oceanside Partners, 111 Haw. 205, 140 P.3d 985 (2006) (holding
that the trial court erred in finding that the developers breached their public trust duty to protect
waters adjacent to the property); Leslie v. Bd. of Appeals, 109 Haw. 384, 126 P.3d 1071 (2006)
(holding that a Special Management Area (SMA) permit must be obtained prior to tentative
subdivision approval); Sierra Club v. Office ofPlanning, 109 Haw. 411, 126 P.3d 1098 (2006)
(holding that a district boundary amendment triggered the requirement for an environmental
assessment); Kepo'o v. Kane, 106 Haw. 270, 103 P.3d 939 (2005) (holding that the lease of
state lands for a power plant was a use of state lands requiring an environmental impact
statement); Morimoto v. Bd. of Land & Natural Res., 107 Haw. 296, 113 P.3d 172 (2005)
(holding that the Board of Land and Natural Resources could approve mitigation measures to
upgrade a state road); T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Cnty. of Hawai'i Planning Comm'n, 106 Haw.
343, 104 P.3d 930 (2005) (holding that a concealed cellular telephone tower and equipment
building were permitted uses in the agricultural district); Bremer v. Weeks, 104 Haw. 43, 85
P.3d 150 (2004) (reversing the lower court and finding evidence of ancient or historic use of a
trail); Morgan v. Planning Dep't, 104 Haw. 173, 86 P.3d 982 (2004) (holding that the planning
commission had the authority to amend a condition of an approved SMA permit); Haw. Elec.
Light Co. v. Dep't of Land & Natural Res., 102 Haw. 257, 75 P.3d 160 (2003) (holding that the
Board of Land and Natural Resources denial of a conditional use permit was invalid because
there were insufficient votes to support the action); Ka Pa'akai 0 Ka 'Aina v. Land Use
Comm'n, 94 Haw. 31, 7 P.3d 1068 (2000) (holding that the Land Use Commission failed to
ensure that legitimate customary and traditional practices of native Hawaiians were protected to
the extent feasible); Curtis v. Bd. of Appeals, 90 Haw. 384, 978 P.2d 822 (1999) (holding that
Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 205-4.5(a) did not permit cellular telephone towers as of
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(ICA).' Third, the court increasingly rendered lengthy opinions,8 many triple
the length of those from the Lum Court and often describing the context in
which the case arose procedurally even when the process was not an issue.
That said, the court certainly set a high bar for thoroughness and explanatory
analysis. For example, its decision in Save Sunset Beach Coalition v. City &
County of Honolulu9 is a model of clarity and organization reminiscent of the
style of opinions written by retired ICA Judge Walter Heeno and retired ICA
Chief Judge James Bums.1
The court continued a trend of the Lum Courtl2 in two cases reinforcing the
importance of plans and planning to our system of land use regulation. Noting
that plans have the force of law in Hawai'i,13 the court held that in the event of
conflict between plans and other land use controls, such as zoning, the most
right); Young v. Planning Comm'n, 89 Haw. 400, 974 P.2d 40 (1999) (holding that the use of
larger vessels in conjunction with a tour operation required an SMA use permit); GATRI v.
Blane, 88 Haw. 108, 962 P.2d 367 (1998) (holding that in the coastal zone, the more restrictive
use specified in the county zoning or general plan controls); Pub. Access Shoreline Haw. v.
Hawai'i Cnty. Planning Comm'n (PASH), 79 Haw. 425, 903 P.2d 1246 (1995) (holding that the
planning commission has an obligation to protect Native Hawaiian rights to the extent
reasonable when issuing a SMA use permit); Mauna Kea Power Co. v. Bd. of Land & Natural
Res., 76 Haw. 259, 874 P.2d 1084 (1994) (holding that the ex parte communication of some
members of the Board of Land and Natural Resources did not deny due process of law to the
developer); Hawaii's Thousand Friends v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 75 Haw. 237, 858 P.2d
726 (1993) (holding that a proposed demolition of structures in a county park would have a
significant environmental impact that required an SMA use permit).
7 Cases in which the Moon Court reversed the ICA include: Brescia, 115 Haw. 477, 168
P.3d 929; Coupe I, 119 Haw. 352, 198 P.3d 615; GATRI, 88 Haw. 108, 962 P.2d 367; Hawaii's
Thousand Friends, 75 Haw. 237, 858 P.2d 726; Ka Pa 'akai O Ka 'Aina, 94 Haw. 31, 7 P.3d
1068; Morgan, 104 Haw. 173, 86 P.3d 982; Save Diamond Head Waters LLC, 121 Haw. 16,
211 P.3d 74; Superferry II, 120 Haw. 181, 202 P.3d 1226; Sierra Club v. Office ofPlanning,
109 Haw. 411, 126 P.3d 1098; and Turtle Bay, 123 Haw. 150, 231 P.3d 423.
The cases in which the Moon Court affirmed the ICA include: Curtis, 90 Haw. 384,978
P.2d 822; Kepo'o, 106 Haw. 270, 103 P.3d 939; Leslie, 109 Haw. 384, 126 P.3d 1071; Mauna
Kea Power Co., 76 Haw. 259, 874 P.2d 1084; PASH, 79 Haw. 425, 903 P.2d 1246; and Young,
89 Haw. 400, 974 P.2d 40.
8 E.g., PASH, 79 Haw. 425, 903 P.2d 1246; Korean Buddhist Dae Won Sa Temple v.
Sullivan, 87 Haw. 217, 953 P.2d 1315 (1998); In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiihole
1), 94 Haw. 97, 9 P.3d 409 (2000); Save Sunset Beach Coal. v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu
(Sunset Beach), 102 Haw. 465, 78 P.3d 1 (2003); Turtle Bay, 123 Haw. 150, 231 P.3d 423.
9 102 Haw. 465, 78 P.3d 1.
10 See, e.g., Topliss v. Planning Comm'n, 9 Haw. App. 377, 842 P.2d 648 (1993).
" See, e.g., Whitesell v. Houlton, 2 Haw. App. 365, 632 P.2d 1077 (1981). Noted
particularly for its incisive brevity, the case is widely cited elsewhere in the United States,
demonstrating that an opinion need not be exhaustive or voluminous to be a respected
landmark.
12 See Lum Yip Kee, Ltd. v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 70 Haw. 179, 767 P.2d 815 (1989).
13 GATRI v. Blane, 88 Haw. 108, 114, 962 P.2d 367, 373 (1998).
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restrictive in terms of permitted uses will control.14 The court also continued a
trend that is appropriately harsh on landowners who knowingly violate land use
controls, whether public or private, particularly height covenants.15 The court
thus required a Buddhist temple to remove a section of its roof that exceeded
local bulk zoning height standards, denying an after-the-fact variance.16
However, the court continued to rigorously examine the language of
covenants, 7 holding that in the event of ambiguity, the dispute would be
resolved against restriction and in favor of the free use of land.' 8
Turning to coastal zone law, the Moon Court continued to decide cases in
favor of coastal zone protection. In one case, the court disallowed an attempt
by Honolulu's Department of Parks and Recreation to "piecemeal" a project in
order to avoid obtaining a Special Management Area (SMA) permit.1' In
another, the court held that in a coastal zone, a restrictive plan trumped a less
restrictive zoning ordinance.20 Finally, the court continued to expand standing,
holding that a Native Hawaiian group with no nearby property interest could
intervene in an SMA permit hearing. 21 The court also virtually rewrote the
state environmental impact statement (EIS) law to protect coastal resources at
Turtle Bay.22
The court continued the expansion of Native Hawaiian rights to both land
and water at the expense of landowners. It reinforced the exercise of traditional
and customary rights guaranteed by the state constitution,23 but did so as to
virtually all land not fully developed, thereby gratuitously launching a direct
14 Sunset Beach, 102 Haw. 465, 78 P.3d 1.
1s E.g., Sandstrom v. Larsen, 59 Haw. 491, 583 P.2d 971 (1978) (requiring a homeowner to
remove the top story of his home because it violated a restrictive height covenant on the
property); see also Pelosi v. Wailea Ranch Estates, 91 Haw. 478, 985 P.2d 1045 (1999)
(establishing a "balancing of the equities" test for enforcing restrictive covenants against
innocent successors to original covenantors).
16 Korean Buddhist Dae Won SaTemple v. Sullivan, 87 Haw. 217,953 P.2d 1315 (1998).
17 See Waikiki Malia Hotel, Inc. v. Kinkai Props. Ltd., 75 Haw. 370, 376-77, 862 P.2d
1048, 1054-55 (1993). This case straddled the transition from the Lum Court to the Moon
Court. Originally heard by the Lum Court, with Chief Justice Lum recused, the case was
decided on November 19, 1993 by the Moon Court.
18 Hiner v. Hoffman, 90 Haw. 188, 977 P.2d 878 (1999).
19 Hawaii's Thousand Friends v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 75 Haw. 237, 858 P.2d 726
(1993).
20 GATRI v. Blane, 88 Haw. 108, 962 P.2d 367 (1998).
21 Pub. Access Shoreline Haw. v. Hawai'i Cnty. Planning Comm'n (PASH), 79 Haw. 425,
903 P.2d 1246 (1995).
22 Unite Here! Local 5 v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu (Turtle Bay), 123 Haw. 150, 231 P.3d
423 (2010).
23 See Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 66 Haw. 1, 656 P.2d 745 (1982). Kalipi is the
Richardson Court's seminal opinion on traditional and customary rights.
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attack on "western concepts" of property like the concept of fee simple.2 4
25While the court later retreated from its original sweeping language, one
suspects that the near-unanimous and hostile reception of Moon Court
decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court in, for example, Hawaii v. Office of
Hawaiian Affairs26 is probably somewhat due to such stances, which vary from
the language in earlier U.S. Supreme Court decisions.27
In the area of water rights, the court ignored both statute and plans in
elevating the rights of Native Hawaiians over commercial agricultural uses,
largely through a breathtakingly expansive definition and use of the public trust
doctrine, 28 reminiscent of the Richardson Court in Robinson v. Ariyoshi.2 9 The
court in Robinson prompted even the Ninth Circuit to wring its collective hands
for years before finally conceding that Hawai'i could define its property and
land use laws so long as it compensates under the U.S. Constitution's Fifth
Amendment for the taking of any property rights thereby.
The court expanded the rights of private landowners in the event of a
physical taking by eminent domain: the defense of pretextuality-appearing
only in a concurrence in the now-infamous Kelo v. City ofNew London30
must be considered virtually whenever raised even if the condemnation is for
the universally accepted public use of constructing a public road.3 ' Because
pretextuality has rarely arisen in reported cases, and then only in publicpurpose
(not public use) cases involving economic revitalization,32 the decision can only
be described as an anomaly.
Finally, for the rest-easements and condominiums-the court encountered
generally mundane factual situations, but still set forth useful, if not
remarkable, opinions.
24 PASH, 79 Haw. at 447, 903 P.2d at 1268. This is a concept close to the heart of the U.S.
Supreme Court. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992) (holding
that a land use regulation that strips a landowner of "all economically beneficial use" constitutes
a taking requiring compensation unless the regulation codifies a nuisance or is part of a state's
"background principles" of its law of property, such as customary or public trust law).
25 State v. Hanapi, 89 Haw. 177, 970 P.2d 485 (1998).
26 556 U.S. 163 (2009).
27 See Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003.
28 Waidlhole I, 94 Haw. 97, 9 P.3d 409 (2000).
29 65 Haw. 641, 658 P.2d 287 (1982).
30 545 U.S. 469, 490-93 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
" Coupe 1, 119 Haw. 352, 198 P.3d 615 (2008), modified by Cnty. of Hawai'i v. C & J
Coupe Family Ltd. P'ship (Coupe Il), 124 Haw. 281, 242 P.3d 1136 (2010).
32 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redev. Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1125 (C.D.
Cal. 2001).
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II. PLANNING AND ZONING
One of the Moon Court's most significant land use law decisions was its
expansion of environmental review requirements in Unite Here! Local5 v. City
and County of Honolulu (Turtle Bay). The significance of the opinion is
especially apparent given that Hawai'i's land use regulatory scheme is already
the most restrictive and complex in the country.34
With state and local governments often involved "in excruciating detail[,]"
nearly all development is "complex, lengthy, expensive, and very often
uncertain."3 5 While some of the difficulties of developing land in Hawai'i go
with the territory,36 some of the Moon Court's decisions-including Turtle
Bay-have only added to Hawai'i's reputation for hostility to economic
development.37 Consistent with the Moon Court's general trend toward
lengthening the environmental review process,38 Turtle Bay's significance
" 123 Haw. 150, 231 P.3d423 (2010).
34 CALLIES, supra note 1, at 1. Hawai'i has a state-level land district classification system in
addition to county zoning schemes. Id. At the state level, all land in Hawai'i is divided into
four districts: urban, rural, agricultural, and conservation. Id. With forty-eight percent of the
state's land designated conservation and forty-seven percent designated agricultural, much
development requires costly and reclassification at the state level into the urban (currently five
percent of state land) or rural (less than half a percent) districts. Id. at 21-22 (citing STATE OF
HAW., DEP'T OF Bus., EcoN. DEV. & TouRIsM, STATE OF HAWAII DATA BOOK 2009 (2010),
available at http://hawaii.gov/dbedt/info/economic/databook/db2009/sectionO6.pdf (with data
current as of Dec. 31, 2006)).
3 Kenneth R. Kupchak, Gregory W. Kugle & Robert H. Thomas, Arrow of Time: Vested
Rights, Zoning Estoppel, and Development Agreements in Hawai'i, 27 U. HAw. L. REv. 17, 17
(2004). The article notes the problems with developing land in Hawai'i and examines vested
rights and zoning estoppel as a "measure of certainty in an otherwise uncertain process and
attempt to minimize the risk that the rug can be pulled out unexpectedly from a property owner
after the government has given the green light to a use and the owner has started down the path
in reliance." Id. at 63.
36 The discovery of Native Hawaiian burials, for example, halts construction and triggers
special procedures. See, e.g., HAw. REV. STAT. § 6E-43.6 (2009) (governing procedure after
inadvertent discovery of burial sites); see generally CALLIES, supra note 1, at 280-86.
3 See, e.g., Jay Fidell, Labyrinthine Land-Use Laws Suffocating Isle Economy, HONOLULU
STAR-ADVERTISER, Mar. 1, 2011, available at http://www.staradvertiser.com/business/
20110301_Labyrinthineland-use lawssuffocating isle economy.html.
3 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Office of Planning, 109 Haw. 411, 126 P.3d 1098 (2006). In
Sierra Club, the court held that the requirement under Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 343-5
that an environmental assessment be prepared at the earliest practical time also pertains to a
district boundary amendment (DBA). This result, however, runs contrary to the nature of the
DBA, which "provides a landowner with considerable discretion in future uses of the land
making it often impossible to so much as speculate about [its] the effects." CALLIES, supra note
1, at 30.
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stems from the uncertainty it adds to Hawai'i's land use regulatory scheme and
the decision's potential to disrupt development.
The Moon Court also considered a number of zoning cases, such as the scope
of the Director of the Honolulu Department of Planning and Permitting's (DPP)
authority to respond to zoning violations and withhold declaratory orders and
variances. In Save Sunset Beach Coalition v. City & County of Honolulu
(Sunset Beach),40 the court held that a zoning map amendment is unequivocally
a legislative act and that in the event of a contradiction between a zoning
designation and a development plan, the more restrictive measure controls.4 1
A. Supplemental Environmental Review
Litigation in Turtle Bay involved the proposed expansion of the Turtle Bay
Resort, a project traceable to the 1980s and delayed largely due to Hawai'i's
economic downturn during the 1990s.42 The project's environmental impact
statement (EIS) was prepared pursuant to the Hawai'i Environmental Policy
Act (HEPA)43 and originally accepted by the Department of Land Utilization"
in 1985.45 The question before the Moon Court was whether the developer's
39 As argued by the developer on appeal, the Turtle Bay ruling provides anyone the "legal
authority under the SEIS Rules to challenge [any] developments that are outside of the time
frame analyzed in its EIS . . . regardless of the depth and breadth of other reviews of project
impact, or other state and federal laws governing and protecting the area." Kuilima Resort
Company's Motion for Reconsideration at 21, Unite Here! Local 5 v. City & Cnty. ofHonolulu
(Turtle Bay), 123 Haw. 150, 231 P.3d 423 (2010) (No. 28602), available at
http://www.inversecondemnation.com/files/kuilimarecon.pdf.
40 102 Haw. 465, 78 P.3d 1 (2003).
41 Id. at 482, 78 P.3d at 18 ("Because the uses allowed in country zoning[] are prohibited
from conflicting with the uses allowed in a State agriculture district, only a more restricted use
as between the two is authorized.").
42 See UNIV. OF HAW., ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR WAIALEE LIVESTOCK
RESEARCH CENTER 24 (July 24, 1980), available at
http://oeqc.doh.hawaii.gov/Shared%20Documents/EA and EISOnlineLibrary/Oahu/1980s/
1980-07-OA-EIS-Waialee-Livestock-Research-Center.pdf (noting that Kuilima's 20-year
development plan was known of by 1980).
43 HEPA is designed to provide environmental impact information only, and does not
obligate the government or its agencies to act upon that information. Not all actions affecting
the environment "trigger" an EIS. The statute lists those that do, like proposed development on
state land, or changing the state designation of conservation land to a less protective
classification.
4 The Department of Planning and Permitting is the Department of Land Utilization's
successor agency. Note the operative language is "accepted" and not "approved." It is not a
discretionary act. The sole question for an "accepting" agency is whether the EIS complies with
a statutory checklist.
45 Unite Here! Local 5 v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu (Turtle Bay),. 123 Haw. 150, 154, 231
P.3d 423, 427 (2010).
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subsequent application for subdivision approval, filed in 2005, triggered a
requirement to file a supplemental EIS (SEIS).46 The Hawai'i Supreme Court
ultimately reversed the circuit court and the ICA, both of which had held that
an SEIS was not required. The court's opinion, by Chief Justice Moon,
substantially expanded the ability of development opponents to challenge the
sufficiency of an accepted EIS and delay or derail projects altogether.
After rejecting Kuilima's arguments that the statute of limitations had run
and that the Environmental Council lacked the authority to promulgate HEPA
rules, the court considered the threshold issue of when an SEIS is required
under HEPA regulations.47 However, instead of clearly stating when an SEIS
is required,48 the court held that because it found a substantive change in the
timing of the project, together with changes extrinsic to the project, the next
step would be to consider whether the change "may have a significant effect.""9
In so holding, the court significantly expanded the type of change, here the
timing of development, that could qualify as "substantial."50 Thus, every EIS is
now subject to a timing condition.
Having found a "substantial change" to the project, the court proceeded to
consider whether the change in timing "may have a significant effect" on the
environment.5' However, the court set a low bar for the fulfillment of the
"significant effect" requirement under HEPA, reasoning that the "plaintiffs
'need not show that significant effects will in fact occur' but instead need only
'raise[] substantial questions whether a project may have a significant
effect[]."' 52 The court ultimately held that this case "clearly 'raises substantial
questions[]' . . . regarding changes in the project area and its impact on the
surrounding communities."
The court specifically considered the issue of traffic impacts, finding that
"the Kuilima expansion project [would] result in traffic impacts that were not
contemplated by the 1985 EIS, which predicted impacts only through the year
46 Id. at 159, 231 P.3d at 432.
47 Id. at 171-77, 231 P.3d at 444-50.
48 See Emily E. Klatt, Traffic, Turtles, and Public Controversy: The Hawaii Environmental
Policy Act and Supplemental Environmental Review 23 (May 2010) (unpublished J.D. thesis,
Univ. of Haw.) (on file with co-author Klatt) (arguing that the court should have clarified the
law on this issue).
41 Turtle Bay, 123 Haw. at 178, 231 P.3d at 451 (quoting HAw. CODE R. § 11-200-26
(1996)).
50 Id. at 177, 231 P.3d at 450.
" Id. at 178, 231 P.3d at 451.
52 Id. (quoting Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Boody, 468 F.3d 549, 562 (9th Cir.
2006)) (emphasis omitted). Co-author Klatt argues that this standard is too low of a burden to
determine whether an SEIS is warranted. See Klatt, supra note 48, at 29.
s Turtle Bay, 123 Haw. at 178, 231 P.3d at 451 (citations omitted).
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2000."54 According to the court, although the traffic impact created by the
project itself had not changed, the mere fact that traffic levels have increased
since 1985 was sufficient to raise substantial questions about significant effect
and thereby necessitate an SEIS. 5 Under such a relaxed standard, virtually any
change could establish a new impact. Take, for example, the plaintiffs
argument that there may be an increased impact to endangered and threatened
species, such as the monk seal and green sea turtle.16 The court found that post-
1985 reports on the monk seals and green sea turtles "clearly qualifry] as 'new'
information or circumstances that were 'not originally disclosed,' not
previously considered, and could have a substantial effect on the
environment."5 7 Finding a "substantial effect," the court reversed the ICA and
required that Kuilima file an SEIS.
The Moon Court's decision in Turtle Bay both construes the requirement to
process an SEIS broadly and lowers the burden of those alleging a HEPA
violation. Large-scale development, particularly in the State of Hawai'i, often
spans lengthy timelines18 and is particularly vulnerable to renewed scrutiny of
an accepted EIS. The result in Turtle Bay undermines finality in the SEIS
process, making it a potent tool to halt development otherwise fully approved.
Regrettably, this is not an isolated example; the Moon Court has expanded and
broadened environmental protection in a number of cases.s9
54 Id.
" Id. at 179, 231 P.3d at 452.
56 Id.
5 Id.
58 Examples of development spanning decades are common in Hawai'i. The developers of
Ko Olina, a 642-acre master-planned resort and residential community in West O'ahu, first
submitted an EIS in 1980. Ko Olina Resort and Marina Home Page, Overview,
http://www.koolina.com/overview (last visited Mar. 18, 2011); W. BEACH RESORTS, FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE PROPOSED WEST BEACH RESORT (Sept. 1980),
available at http://oeqc.doh.hawaii.gov/Shared%20Documents/EAand EISOnline
Library/Oahu/1980s/1980-09-OA-FEIS-West-Beach-Resort.pdf. The Ko Olina plan called for
1680 residential units, 7520 hotel/condominium units, and various other improvements. Id.
The most recent building in the project, Disney's Aulani Resort, broke ground in 201 0-thirty
years after the original EIS was accepted. The development of the central O'ahu communityof
Mililani took over forty years to complete, and even relatively small scale government
infrastructure work, such as sewer projects, can routinely take over ten years. Janis L. Magin,
Court's Turtle Bay Ruling Could Affect Other Hawaii Projects, PAC. Bus. NEWS, Apr. 16,2010,
available at www.bizjournals.com/pacific/stories/2010/04/19/story7.html.
5 See, e.g., Brescia v. N. Shore Ohana, 115 Haw. 477, 168 P.3d 929 (2007) (holding the
larger shoreline setback applicable); GATRI v. Blane, 88 Haw. 108, 962 P.2d 367 (1998)
(holding that in the coastal zone, the more restrictive use specified in the county zoning or
general plan controls); Hawaii's Thousand Friends v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 75 Haw. 237,
858 P.2d 726 (1993); Superferry I, 120 Haw. 181, 202 P.3d 1226 (2009) (holding that a
proposed demolition of structures in a county park would have a significant environmental
impact and required an SMA use permit); Sierra Club v. Office of Planning, 109 Haw. 411, 126
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B. Zoning Controls
The Moon Court considered a variety of zoning cases, but perhaps its most
noteworthy contribution was its extension of the role of the land use plan as the
basis for land use control in Save Sunset Beach Coalition v. City & County of
Honolulu (Sunset Beach).60 The court under Chief Justice Lum had previously
established that zoning must conform to development plans in the 1989
decision Lum Yip Kee, Ltd. v. City and County ofHonolulu.6' The holding in
Lum Yip Kee made Hawai'i one of the "states in the forefront of the
requirement that zoning must conform to and be based upon comprehensive
planning."62 In Sunset Beach, the Moon Court reiterated the important role of
planning in Hawai'i land use law. The court held that in the event of a
contradiction between a plan and zoning designation, the more restrictive of the
two controls, and that both plan map and zoning map amendments are
legislative acts.63
In Sunset Beach, the primary issue on appeal was the plaintiffs' challenge6
65to the Honolulu City Council's grant of rezoning from agricultural to country.
The court rejected the plaintiffs' initial argument that rezoning and amendment
of a development plan via county ordinance for the benefit of a specific
property are quasi-judicial actions, holding instead that both are always
legislative acts. This result is significant because it affords both zoning and
development plans a deferential standard ofjudicial review and a presumption
of validity.67
The court thus expanded the consistency doctrine established in GA TRI v.
Blane, which requires that the more restrictive permitted use between a
zoning designation and a development plan controls, but only in the coastal
zone. Sunset Beach explicitly requires compliance with the most restrictive
use of the three tiers of land use controls-state land use districts, county
zoning, and development plans-anywhere in the state, not just in the coastal
P.3d 1098 (2006) (holding that a district boundary amendment triggered the requirement for an
environmental assessment).
60 102 Haw. 465, 469, 78 P.3d 1, 5 (2003).
61 70 Haw. 179, 767 P.2d 815 (1989).
62 Callies, Kalama & Kellett, supra note 2, at 123.
63 Sunset Beach, 102 Haw. at 469, 78 P.3d at 5.
6 Id. at 468, 78 P.3d at 4. The plaintiffs included two interest groups, Save Sunset Beach
Coalition and Life of the Land, and individual residents of the North Shore. Id.
6s Id. at 472, 78 P.3d at 8.
66 Id. at 473-74, 78 P.3d at 9-10.
67 Id. at 468, 78 P.3d at 4.
68 GATRI v. Blane, 88 Haw. 108, 962 P.2d 367 (1998). The holding in GATRI applied
only to the coastal zone, largely on the ground that the applicable statute so required.
69 Sunset Beach, 102 Haw. at 482, 78 P.3d at 18.
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zone. This outcome is consistent with the recognition of the comprehensive
plan as law in Lum Yip Kee.
Another important case illustrated that the court would strictly uphold land
use controls. In Korean Buddhist Dae Won Sa Temple v. Sullivan, the Moon
Court considered a challenge to the Director of the Department of Land
Utilization's (DLU) refusal to issue a declaratory order or variance to cure a
building height violation.70 The building was a Korean temple's hall, which
included an unpermitted extra floor and exceeded the maximum building height
allowed by the building permit." The temple was unsuccessful in its first
attempt to obtain a variance from the Director of the DLU as well as in its
appeal of his decision to the Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA).n The temple
subsequently filed a separate variance application; the Director again denied it
and the temple unsuccessfully appealed to the ZBA and later the circuit court.73
The Hawai'i Supreme Court reasoned that the Director's refusal to issue a
declaratory ruling did not rise to the applicable standard of "arbitrary and
capricious."7 4 The court also found that the Director relied on sufficient
evidence so that he did not abuse his discretion in denying the variance
application.7 5 Lastly, the court considered and rejected the temple's claim of a
violation on First Amendment free exercise grounds. Despite the harsh result
of a requirement to tear down the offending portion of the structure, the court
deferred to the Director's ruling and refused to modify it.77
III. COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT PROTECTION LAW
A. SMA Permits: Clarification of Obligations to Meet Requirements
Given the tension between development of the coastal area and protection of
coastal environmental resources, it is unsurprising that the Special Management
Area (SMA) permitting process was the focus of a number of Moon Court
cases. 78
70 87 Haw. 217, 953 P.2d 1315 (1998).
7 Id. at 222, 953 P.2d at 1320.
72 Id. at 223, 953 P.2d at 1321.
73 Id. at 227, 953 P.2d at 1325.
74 Id. at 230-31, 953 P.2d at 1328-29.
7 Id. at 235, 953 P.2d at 1333.
76 Id. at 247, 953 P.2d at 1345.
7 Id. at 249, 953 P.2d at 1347.
7 Morgan v. Planning Dep't, 104 Haw. 173, 86 P.3d 982 (2004); GATRI v. Blane, 88 Haw.
108, 962 P.2d 367 (1998); Pub. Access Shoreline Haw. v. Hawai'i Cnty. Planning Conun'n
(PASH), 79 Haw. 425, 903 P.2d 1246 (1995); Hawaii's Thousand Friends v. City & Cnty. of
Honolulu, 75 Haw. 237, 858 P.2d 726 (1993).
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In Public Access Shoreline Hawaii v. Hawai'i County Planning Commission
(PASH), the court held that the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA)
imposes an obligation to "preserve and protect" Native Hawaiian rights to the
extent "reasonable" when issuing an SMA use permit." The court specified
that "in order for any conditions placed on a SMA permit issued by the
[Hawai'i County Planning Commission] on remand to be deemed
'reasonable,"' 8 0 they must pass the heightened scrutiny test formulated in
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission8 ' and Dolan v. City of Tigard.82
PASH establishes that the requirements of an essential nexus to a legitimate
state interest (set forth in Nollan) and rough proportionality to the impact of the
proposed development (set forth in Dolan) apply to conditions placed on land
development under the CZMA." The decision is also notable for its extended
treatment of Native Hawaiian traditional and customary rights guaranteed by
the 1978 State Constitution even though the issue before the court was largely
one of standing to participate in a county contested case hearing.8 4
In GA TRI v. Blane,85 the Hawai'i Supreme Court held that a party seeking an
SMA permit must demonstrate general plan and zoning consistency under
Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 205A-26(2)(C). 86 GATRI, a Hawai'i limited
partnership, applied for an SMA permit to develop a commercial building on
land located within Maui's SMA area. The Maui County Department of
88 A8he9~aPlanning Director denied the permit, and the trial court reversed,89 finding
that development consistent with the governing zoning ordinance was per se
consistent with the general plan.90 However, the Hawai'i Supreme Court
ultimately rejected the trial court's interpretation of the statute, finding it
inconsistent with fundamental principles of statutory construction.91 The Moon
Court specified that county general plans have the "force and effect of law
insofar as the statute requires that a development within the SMA must be
7 PASH, 79 Haw. at 435, 903 P.2d at 1256.
80 Id. at 436, 903 P.2d at 1257.
483 U.S. 825 (1987).
82 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
83 PASH, 79 Haw. at 436, 903 P.2d at 1257.
84 See id. at 437-51, 903 P.2d at 1258-72.
8s 88 Haw. 108, 962 P.2d 367 (1998).
86 Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 205A-26(2)(C) requires "[t]hat the development [be]
consistent with the county general plan and zoning. Such a finding of consistency does not
preclude concurrent processing where a general plan or zoning amendment may also be
required."
87 GATRI, 88 Haw. at 109, 962 P.2d at 368.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id
9' Id. at 114, 962 P.2d at 374.
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consistent with the general plan." 9 2 Thus, after GA TRI, SMA permits are
subject to a double consistency requirement.
B. SMA Permits and Process: Strict Construction ofProcedural
Requirements
The Moon Court continued to construe the procedural requirements of the
CZMA strictly.9 3 In Hawaii's Thousand Friends v. City & County of
Honolulu,9 4 the City and County of Honolulu's (City) Department of Land
Utilization (DLU) determined that the City's Department of Parks and
Recreation (DPR) was not required to obtain an SMA use permit for its
proposed demolition of several structures on a parcel within the coastal zone
management area.95 Hawaii's Thousand Friends (Friends), a community
organization, sought a declaratory order that an SMA use permit was required
for the demolition.96 The First Circuit Court held that "where demolition of
existing structures is part of an overall project, and where such project may
have a significant environmental impact on the special management area, the
demolition is 'development' within the meaning of chapter 25," and thus an
SMA permit is required. 97 The Hawai'i Supreme Court rejected the City's
contention that Friends was required to exhaust its administrative remedies by
seeking review by the Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) prior to appealing its
case to the circuit court.98 The court reasoned that the jurisdiction of the ZBA
did not include SMA review, because section 6-909(a) of the Honolulu Charter
"restricts appeals to the ZBA from those DLU actions concerning 'the
administration of the zoning and subdivision ordinances[.]"' 99 The court also
rejected the City's second jurisdictional argument that because Friends had
available to it the statutory remedy provided in Hawai'i Revised Statutes
section 205A-6, the circuit court erred in granting jurisdiction to consider relief
by declaratory judgment under Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 632-1.1oo
In Morgan v. Planning Department, the Kaua'i County Planning
Commission granted an SMA use permit to build a rock revetment on shoreline
property, but the landowner instead built a seawall.10 Several years later,
92 id.
9 Callies, Kalama & Kellett, supra note 2, at 134.
94 75 Haw. 237, 858 P.2d 726 (1993).
9 Id. at 238-39, 858 P.2d at 728.
96 Id. at 239, 858 P.2d at 728.
9 Id. at 241, 858 P.2d at 729.
98 Id. at 244, 858 P.2d at 730.
9 Id.
'00 Id. at 245, 858 P.2d at 731.
01 104 Haw. 173, 175, 86 P.3d 982, 984 (2004).
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neighboring landowners complained that the revetment had caused the erosion
of beach area in front of their properties.1 02 After a number of public hearings,
"the Planning Commission issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law,
decision and order[,]" and modified a condition of the original SMA permit. 03
On appeal, the circuit court held that the Planning Commission lacked authority
to modify an SMA permit. The Hawai'i Supreme Court reversed, reasoning
that a Hawai'i planning commission "has authority to reconsider a validly
issued SMA [u]se permit, inasmuch as the Planning Commission's enabling
statute requires that the Planning Commission carry out the policies and
objectives of the [Coastal Zone Management Act.]" 0 5
IV. PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
The concept of the public trust is a common law doctrine that requires the
state to hold title to certain natural resources in trust for the public. Hawai'i's
public trust doctrine evolved under a "complex interweaving of unique
principles of Hawai'i law . . . [with] shared aspects of American
jurisprudence," and can conceptually be traced back to the ancient Hawaiian
system of water rights.'06  In 1899, the Republic of Hawai'i's high court
introduced the U.S. Supreme Court's rule from Illinois Central Railroad Co. v.
Illinois'0 7 to Hawai'i, holding that title to the submerged lands of Honolulu
Harbor were "held in trust for the people of the state that they may enjoy the
navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of
fishing therein freed from the obstruction or interference of private parties."' 08
Subsequent cases illustrated the firm establishment of the doctrine in Hawai'i's
jurisprudence.109
102 Id. at 176, 86 P.3d at 985.
1o3 Id. at 177, 86 P.3d at 986.
' Id.
'0 Id. at 182, 86 P.3d at 991.
106 Keala C. Ede, He Kanawai Pono No Ka Wai (A Just Law for Water): The Application
and Implications of the Public Trust Doctrine in In Re Water Use Permit Applications, 29
ECOL. L.Q. 283, 288 (2002).
107 146 U.S. 387 (1892). The U.S. Supreme Court noted that it was "the settled law of this
country that the ownership of and dominion and sovereignty over lands covered by tide waters,
within the limits of the several states, belong to the respective states within which they are
found." Id. at 435. See generally Douglas L. Grant, Underpinnings of the Public Trust
Doctrine: Lessons from Illinois Central Railroad, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 849 (2001).
108 King v. Oahu Ry. & Land Co., 11 Haw. 717, 723 (1899) (quoting Illinois Central R.R.
Co., 146 U.S. at 452).
1" See, e.g., State ex rel. Kobayashi v. Zimring, 58 Haw. 106, 121, 566 P.2d 725, 735
(1977) ("Under public trust principles, the State as trustee has the duty to protect and maintain
the trust property and regulate its use. Presumptively, this duty is to be implemented by
devoting the land to actual public uses, e. g., recreation.").
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Groundwater resources, however, were not recognized as part of the State's
public trust. Historically, Hawai'i's territorial courts instead recognized
"absolute [private] ownership" over groundwater, so that an overlying
landowner could pump
all of the water that naturally flows from the well or that can be drawn therefrom
by any pump, however powerful, and . .. he may use the water as he pleases and
may conduct it to supply lands and communities at any distance from his own
piece or parcel of land and may even waste it.' '0
The rule of absolute ownership was abandoned in 1929, when the court
adopted a "correlative rights" rule: an overlying landowner could use as much
groundwater as was needed for the overlying property, so long as such usage
did not interfere with the rights of other surface owners."' Correlative rights
remained a cornerstone of Hawai'i water law for over seventy years, until the
Moon Court's voluminous Waidhole Idecision in 2000.112
The litigation surrounded the Waiihole Ditch System, which had diverted
groundwater from windward to central O'ahu for sugar cultivation since the
early 1900s." 3 After the O'ahu Sugar Company, a primary user of the ditch
system, announced it would cease operations in 1993, various groups petitioned
for use or conservation of the newly available water.1 4 Over two dozen
applications from leeward farmers, windward community associations, and
surface owners, among others,"'5 were sent to a newly-established Water
Resource Management Commission and eventually consolidated into one
exhaustive contested case hearing lasting nearly a year."' 6 The Commission
allocated the water largely to leeward agricultural and non-agricultural uses and
"system losses," for "proposed agricultural reserve," or a "non-permitted
ground water buffer" to be released in windward streams." 7 Several parties
appealed the allocation, including the nonagricultural users widely perceived to
have "won" before the Commission.
The Hawai'i Supreme Court criticized not only portions ofthe Commission's
allocation, but also its "permissive view towards stream diversion.""'8 Noting
that it had "rejected the idea of public streams serving as convenient reservoirs
10 City Mill Co. v. Honolulu Sewer & Water Comm'n, 30 Haw. 912,922 (1929), overruled
by Waiahole I, 94 Haw. 97, 177, 9 P.3d 409, 489 (2000).
"' City Mill Co., 30 Haw. at 923-28.
112 WaidholeI, 94 Haw. 97,9 P.3d 409(2000). See generally David L. Callies &Calvert G.
Chipchase, Water Regulation, Land Use and the Environment, 30 U. HAW. L. REv. 49 (2007).
113 Waiahole I, 94 Haw. at 111, 9 P.3d at 423.
114 Id. at 112, 9 P.3d at 424.
115 Callies & Chipchase, supra note 112, at 67.
116 WaiaholeI, 94 Haw. at I13,9 P.3d at 425.
117 Id. at 118, 9 P.3d at 430.
118 Id. at 160, 9 P.3d at 472.
649
University ofHawai'i Law Review / Vol. 33:635
for offstream private use,"" 9 the court found that the Commission's decision
had "largely defeat[ed] the purpose of the instream use protection scheme set
forth in [the Hawai'i Water Code]" 20 and reiterated that "[e]very cessation to
immediate offstream demands made by the Commission increases the risk of
unwarranted impairment of instream values, ad hoc planning, and arbitrary
distribution. 11 In so finding, the court remanded the case to the Commission
for additional findings and conclusions regarding the evidence and
methodology used by the Commission in making its allocations. 122 Ultimately,
the Hawai'i Supreme Court vacated most of the Commission's commercial
allocations, including many initially provided to leeward O'ahu farmers.
Although the majority of growth (as projected by O'ahu's general and
development plans, with which the Water Commission was required to comply)
was to occur in leeward O'ahu, the court nevertheless found such allocations
unsupported by the record.123
More important than the allocations, however, was the court's dramatic
expansion of the public trust and its use to trump the statutory hierarchy
painstakingly established in the Hawai'i Water Code. The court uncritically
accepted the Commission's view that the public trust applied to all "water
resources" within the state, regardless of navigability.124 It relied on (1)
Hawai'i constitutional amendments that the court "interpreted" as extending the
public trust to underground water,125 and (2) a historical interpretation that the
Kingdom of Hawai'i had reserved title to water to itself, so that groundwater
rights did not transfer with changes in ownership.126 The court committed itself
to balancing public and private purposes with a presumption in favor of public
use, access, and enjoyment, while paying scant attention to the water code's
careful hierarchical allocation framework coupled with statutorily required
reliance on county plans. 12 7 New standards were also created. Surface owners
in non-designated areas were required to obtain Commission approval for any
requested withdrawal to determine whether it was "necessary for reasonable
use." 28 This effectively put surface owners in no better position than any other
applicant.
" " Id. at 155, 9 P.3d at 467.
120 Id. at 154, 9 P.3d at 466.
121 id.
122 Callies & Chipchase, supra note 112, at 69.
123 Id. at 72.
124 Waiahole I, 94 Haw. at 128-35, 9 P.3d at 440-47.
125 Callies & Chipchase, supra note 112, at 69.
126 Waiahole 1, 94 Haw. at 128-35, 9 P.3d at 440-47.
127 Id. at 142, 9 P.3d at 454.
128 Id. at 178, 9 P.3d at 490.
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Both premises relied upon by the court are seriously flawed. First, the
constitutional amendments of the 1970s cannot "inform private property rights
established over a hundred years earlier" during the Great Mahele. 129 Thus,
"[t]he titles that passed to private owners from the Kingdom of Hawai'i cannot
be rewritten to exclude what at the time of transfer was an appurtenance of real
property."13 0 Second, Hawai'i territorial decisions held that the Kingdom did
not retain ownership of groundwater when real property was transferred to a
private owner.' 3 ' Therefore, groundwater was owned by private individuals,
subject to the usage limitations of correlative rights. The court's Waiihole I
decision, broadening the public trust and reducing a surface owner's ability to
make reasonable use of underlying water, ultimately marked the loss of an
individual owner's property rights, resulting in a "taking" in every sense of the
word.
V. EMINENT DOMAIN
In a bow to securing private property rights, the court added a substantive
requirement for every governmental exercise of eminent domain: consideration
of a pretextuality defense, added on the strength of a brief line in a concurring
opinion from the U.S. Supreme Court. 132 The remaining cases in this category
dealt with problems raised by the 1967 Land Reform Act,133 which used
condemnation to transfer fee title in real property from lessors to lessees in an
attempt to eradicate what the Hawai'i Legislature deemed the "social and
economic evils of a land oligopoly." 34
A. "Public Use, " "Public Purpose, " and Pretext
The significance of the Moon Court's decision in County ofHawai'i v. C &
J Coupe Family Limited Partnership (Coupe 1)1' requires a basic
understanding of eminent domain, the government's ability to take a private
citizen's land or an interest in land. The main constitutional protections to such
an action are provided by the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,
requiring that any private property taken must be for "public use" and
accompanied by payment of "just compensation." 36
129 Callies & Chipchase, supra note 112, at 73.
130 id.
131 Id. at 74.
132 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 490 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
133 HAW. REv. STAT. ch. 516 (2006 & Supp. 2010).
134 Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1984).
131 119 Haw. 352, 198 P.3d 615 (2008).
136 U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
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However, following the U.S. Supreme Court's virtual elimination of the
public use clause of the Fifth Amendment in Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff-137 and the subsequent confirmation in Kelo v. City ofNew London that
not only did public use equal public purpose, but that "economic revitalization"
or "rejuvenation" constituted such a public purpose,'38 one check arguably
remained on the use of eminent domain: pretext.139 Although a condemnation
need only be "rationally related to a conceivable public purpose," a transfer of
property via eminent domain that "intended to confer benefits on particular,
favored private entities, and with only incidental or pretextual public benefits. .
. [remained] forbidden by the Public Use Clause."l 4 0
The poster child case of pretextual condemnation involved the condemnation
of one retailer to placate another, more influential, retailer in California. In 99
Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency,141 Costco moved into a
shopping mall as an anchor tenant, followed by a 99 Cents Only Store into a
nearby vacant space. 142 Costco later demanded that it be allowed to expand
into the space leased by the 99 Cents Only Store. 143 Unable to reach an
agreement, the city ultimately initiated "friendly eminent domain proceedings"
to acquire the space for Costco's expansion.'" The U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California noted the low Midkiff standard of "rationally
related to a conceivable public purpose," but found that "[n]o judicial deference
is required .. . where the ostensible public use is demonstrably pretextual." 4 5
The condemnation of the 99 Cents Only Store was nothing more than the
"naked transfer of property from one private party to another." 4 6 The court
also rejected the city's feeble argument that losing Costco could result in
"future blight" to the areal47 and enjoined the condemnation.148
While the purpose of some condemnations for urban renewal and economic
revitalization may well prove to be pretextual, most condemnations for use by
the public are unequivocally not pretextual, such as condemnation to build or
expand public roads. Overturning all courts below, the Moon Court 4 9 found
137 467 U.S. at 241.
13 545 U.S. 469, 483 (2005).
139 Id. at 490 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
140 id
141 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1125 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
142 Id. at 1126.
143 id.
144 id
145 Id. at 1129.
146 id.
147 Id. at 1130.
148 Id. at 1131.
149 Chief Justice Moon dissented from the majority's holding that the "asserted public
purpose was pretextual." Coupe 1, 119 Haw. 352, 390, 198 P.3d 615,653 (2008) (Moon, C.J.,
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public use road condemnations potentially pretextual in Coupe I.150 There, as
part of the statutorily-authorized development agreement 15' to develop the
Hokuli'a luxury golf-course community project on the island of Hawai'i,'52 the
developer had agreed to construct a bypass road to alleviate traffic congestion
and create additional access from existing roads.' 53 After the developer failed
to procure all the necessary land through negotiation, the developer requested
that the County initiate condemnation proceedings for the hold-out parcels in
accordance with the terms of its statutory development agreement with the
County of Hawai'i, which had planned for such a bypass road for decades.'
In challenging the government's use of eminent domain, a hold-out landowner
claimed that the condemnation was "instituted for the private benefit of [the
developer]," in violation of the public use clause of the U.S. Constitution.'5 5
In an opinion at odds with nearly all jurisdictions, including the U.S.
Supreme Court,156 a three-justice majority of the Hawai'i Supreme Court'57
held that a public highway was not necessarily a public use. According to the
court, "although our courts afford substantial deference to the government's
asserted public purpose for a taking in condemnation proceeding, where there is
evidence that the asserted purpose is pretextual, courts should consider a
landowner's defense of pretext."' 58 Requiring courts to consider a pretext
argument for a public use-here a road condemnation-is at odds with decades
of precedent. 59 The U.S. Supreme Court stated as early as 1923: "That a
dissenting).
Iso 119 Haw. 352, 198 P.3d 615. See generally Robert H. Thomas, Recent Developments in
Public Use and Pretext in Eminent Domain, 41 URB. LAw. 563, 565-68 (2009).
151 See generally DAVID L. CALLIES, DANIEL J. CURTIN, JR. & JULIE A. TAPPENDORF,
BARGAINING FOR DEVELOPMENT 95-115 (2003) (discussing development agreements); HAW.
REv. STAT. § 46-123 (1993). During the development approval process, developers and local
government face two problems: the local government's inability to exact dedications of land or
fees to mitigate the impact of the development without establishing a clear connection between
the proposed development and the dedication or fee, and the developer's inability to rely on a
vested right to continue the development until the project begins. Development agreements,
often authorized by statute (as in Hawai'i), can address both problems. Id. at 95.
152 Coupel, 119 Haw. at 356, 198 P.3d at 619.
153 id
154 Id. at 359, 198 P.3d at 622.
'ss Id.
156 See Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles Cnty., 262 U.S. 700 (1923).
1s7 The majority consisted of Justices Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy. Justice Levinson joined
in Chief Justice Moon's dissent.
1s8 Coupe I, 119 Haw. at 357, 198 P.3d at 620.
1s9 See, e.g., Rogren v. Corwin, 147 N.W. 517, 519 (Mich. 1914) ("That private property
may be constitutionally taken for public highways cannot be doubted, and is not denied.");
Rodgers Dev. Co. v. Town of Tilton, 781 A.2d 1029, 1034 (N.H. 2001) ("It is well settled that
whenever property is taken for a highway, it is for the public use[.]") (internal quotation marks
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taking of property for a highway is a taking for public use has been universally
recognized, from time immemorial." 60
Nevertheless, the Hawai'i Supreme Court remanded to the circuit court to
take evidence on pretext. That court ultimately found that the County's
asserted public purpose was not pretext for a primarily private benefit.161
Citing cases from several jurisdictions, the court unsurprisingly found "the
record reflect[ed] that (the developer] was not the only entity that stood to
benefit from the construction of the Bypass."l6 2 In fact, over the decades, many
studies and plans undertaken by the County had recognized the public's need
for the bypass.'6 3 While the pretext claim in Coupe Iultimately failed, the fact
that it was so much as entertained by the Hawai'i Supreme Court over
condemnation of land for a public road demonstrates that pretext is now a
feasible property owner's defense to any condemnation in Hawai'i.
B. Eminent Domain for "Land Reform"
The other major eminent domain cases during the Moon era addressed issues
initially raised by the 1967 Land Reform Act,' " a statute that effectively used
condemnation to transfer fee title in real property from lessors to lessees. The
Legislature had found that a mere twenty-two landowners owned 72.5% of fee
simple titles on O'ahu, and that across the state seventy-two private landowners
owned 47% of the state's land.'65 In order to reduce the "social and economic
evils of a land oligopoly," the Legislature passed the Act to force the transfer of
fee simple interests to the lessee-owners of the respective residences atop the
leasehold.'66 The U.S. Supreme Court upheld this scheme in Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff stating that "[r]egulating oligopoly and the evils associated
with it is a classic exercise of a State's police powers .... "i Thus, with the
confusing conflation of police power and public use in Berman v. Parker,16 8
transfers of title under the Land Reform Act passed the public use test even
though the result was to transfer an interest in land from one private owner to
another, thereby opening the door for arguments equating public use (the
constitutional term in the Fifth Amendment) with public purpose.
and citation omitted).
160 Rindge Co., 262 U.S. at 706.
161 Coupe III, 124 Haw. 281, 242 P.3d 1136 (2010).
162 Id. at 298, 242 P.3d at 1153.
161 Id. at 298-99, 242 P.3d at 1153-54.
'6 HAW.REV. STAT. ch. 516 (2006 & Supp. 2010).
165 Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 232 (1984).
166 Id. at 241-42.
167 Id. at 242.
168 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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The Moon Court took up several subsequent challenges to lease-to-fee
conversions. In Richardson v. City and County of Honolulu, plaintiffs
challenged the Honolulu City Council's enactment of the county-level version
of the Land Reform Act.169 Plaintiff landowners alleged that the City lacked
authority to pass the ordinance because of preemption by various state statutes
and because the State had not delegated such authority to the City.17 0 The
Richardson court rejected such arguments, instead finding the allegedly
conflicting statutes "neither limit the counties' (and therefore the City's)
general power of eminent domain ... nor divest them of the authority to enact
ordinances allowing for the condemnation of land for any particular public
purpose."' 7 1 The court also found that the City had not improperly delegated its
power of eminent domain to the Department of Housing and Community
Development:17 2 the Department was empowered merely to designate land for
condemnation, facilitating the City's actual exercise of the power of eminent
domain. 173
In Housing Finance and Development Corp. v. Castle,174 the court addressed
whether the Hawai'i Land Reform Act "remained constitutional, i.e., whether
the HLRA continues to comport with the 'public use' clauses" of the U.S. and
Hawai'i Constitutions.175 Trustees of the Castle Estate, which held the leased
fee interest in the residential houselots subject to the condemnation, brought the
challenge.176 Up against the unfavorable precedent of Midkin'77 and Lyman,17
which upheld the constitutionality of the Act, plaintiffs argued that "[n]either
[Midkiff nor Lyman] held that henceforth or forever into the future every
condemnation of a leased fee pursuant to [the HLRA] would necessarily be for
a public purpose." 79 The trustees urged that condemnation of the specific
houselots in question did not satisfy the public use requirement, but the court
rejected the contention that "HLRA can vacillate in and out of constitutionality
depending upon the condition of the residential real estate market in Hawai'i at
169 76 Haw. 46, 51-52, 868 P.2d 1193, 1198-99 (1994). This was codified as chapter 38 of
the Honolulu Revised Ordinances and applies to multi-family developments held as
condominiums, cooperative housing developments, and planned unit developments.
HONOLULU, HAW., REv. ORDINANCEs ch. 38 (1992).
170 Richardson, 76 Haw. at 53, 868 P.2d at 1200.
171 Id. at 57, 868 P.2d at 1204.
172 Id. at 58-59, 868 P.2d at 1205-06.
17 id.
'4 79 Haw. 64, 898 P.2d 576 (1995).
17 Id. at 73, 898 P.2d at 585.
176 Id. at 78, 898 P.2d at 590.
n Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
178 Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Lyman, 68 Haw. 55, 704 P.2d 888 (1985).
179 Hous. Fin. & Dev. Corp., 79 Haw. at 86, 898 P.2d at 598.
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any given moment."' 80 Instead, the court reiterated that under the U.S.
Supreme Court's standard in Midkiff "it is irrelevant whether the legislature
was empirically correct in the first place, so long as the legislature rationally
could have believed that it was."' 8 '
The court later rejected a church's federal Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) defense to eminent domain under the
Act in City & County of Honolulu v. Sherman.182 Plaintiff church claimed
lease-to-fee conversion was a land use regulation that impermissibly interfered
with the church's exercise of religion.' 83 The court found instead that chapter
38 condemnation was not a "land use regulation" under RLUIPA,184
demonstrating the gap in RLUIPA under which a regulation is subject to strict
scrutiny but an appropriation of land is apparently permissible.'8 5 The Sherman
court also addressed the church's claim that the City had improperly delegated
the power of eminent domain to the City Department of Community Service
(DCS).'8 6 The church attempted to distinguish the Richardson holding on the
issue as mere facial consideration, and in practice, the DCS's determination to
condemn land was being interpreted by the City as a legal mandate to initiate
the condemnation proceedings.' 87 The court found that Richardson's holding
was still applicable and that DCS's actions merely facilitated the City's ultimate
act of condemnation. 88
1so Id. at 87, 898 P.2d at 599.
"' Id. at 90, 898 P.2d at 602 (emphasis in original).
"2 110 Haw. 39, 129 P.3d 542 (2006). RLUIPA is a federal statute designed to protect
religious institutions from regulations-specifically including zoning-which adversely affect
the practice of religion. For a detailed explanation of RLUIPA and a survey of cases, see
RLUIPA READER: RELIGIOUS LAND USES, ZONING, AND THE COURTS (Michael S. Giaimo & Lora
A. Lucero eds., 2009).
1 Sherman, 110 Haw. at 55-56, 129 P.3d at 558-59.
'8 Id. at 61, 129 P.3d at 564.
185 See id.; see also Robert H. Thomas, 2006 Land Use in Review: Land Reform Revisited,
INVERSECONDEMNATION.COM (Dec. 30, 2006), http://www.inversecondemnation.com/
inversecondemnation/2006/12/2006_landuse i 3.html ("It does seem odd for Congress to
have excluded an outright appropriation of a church's property, while requiring strict scrutiny
for mere regulation. If onerous regulatory decisions should be judged strictly by the courts to
insure they do not interfere with the free exercise of religion, how is that actually depriving a
church of its property should be immune from such scrutiny?" (emphases in original)).
186 Sherman, 110 Haw. at 69, 129 P.3d at 572.
'8 Id.
188 Id. at 70, 129 P.3d at 573.
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VI. CONDOMINIUM APARTMENTS1 89
By way of an introduction, the characteristics of a condominium property
regime are (1) individual ownership of a unit in the project, (2) an undivided
interest in the common elements of the project (the swimming pool, parking lot,
and underlying land, for example), and (3) some form of agreement between
the owners regulating how the project will be run. It becomes easy to see that
these characteristics present unique challenges.' 90 With Hawai'i having the
highest percentage of condominium unit occupancy in the nation, it is no
surprise that the Moon Court took several cases to flesh out the mechanics of
condominium associations.
Because condominium ownership is characterized by mixed joint and
separate ownership, determining the proper party to bring a lawsuit is not
always clear. In Alford v. City and County of Honolulu,'9' owners in a
condominium project sued the City in an attempt to restore the real property tax
classification of their units from "hotel and resort" back to "apartment." 92 The
case turned on whether the Board of Directors had standing to authorize a
representative to bring appeals on behalf of the owners.'93 Acknowledging that
the statutory directive allowed a board to bring an action that related to more
than one apartment, the City argued that county law giving only a taxpayer the
right to bring an appeal should prevail. 194 The Hawai'i Supreme Court rejected
this argument and held that the Board of Directors of the condominium
association had standing to authorize a representative to bring tax appeals on
behalf of the owners of fee units.195
Condominium operations procedure, in terms of how an association meeting
should be conducted, also came before the court. Association meetings usually
abide by parliamentary procedure, most commonly as laid out by Robert's
Rules of Order.19 6 In Alvarez Family Trust v. Association of Apartment
Owners of Kaanapali Alii,'97 a board's voting mechanism was challenged. 98
189 "Condominium" is a form of ownership, not a residential unit, as any careful real estate
lawyer knows, but for the purposes of this section we use it as the vernacular noun it has
become.
190 State Savings & Loan Ass' v. Kauaian Dev. Co., 50 Haw. 540, 445 P.2d 109 (1968),
was the first case to apply "condominium law" in Hawai'i. The opinion paved the way for
condominiums to be received in the common law system in Hawai'i.
'9' 109 Haw. 14, 122 P.3d 809 (2005).
192 Id. at 17, 122 P.3d at 812.
' Id. at 23-24, 122 P.3d at 818-19.
194 Id. at 24, 122 P.3d at 819.
SId. at 25, 122 P.3d at 820.
196 1 GARY A. POLIAKOFF, LAW OF CONDOMINIUM OPERATIONS § 3:49 (1988).
9 121 Haw. 474, 221 P.3d 452 (2009).
198 Id. at 478, 221 P.3d at 456.
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Of the seven directors present at the meeting regarding "a 'pricing policy'
setting the price at which the Association would sell its leased fee interests to
its members,"199 three voted "for," two voted "against," and two abstained.200
The Board deemed the policy approved.20 1 The court found that the pricing
policy was not validly passed because the Association's bylaws adopted a
"members present" requirement for the Board to act,202 so that the presence of
members must be taken into account when calculating the majority.2 03 Because
there were seven directors at the meeting, four affirmative votes were required
to pass the measure.204 In so holding, the court rejected the owners' argument
that, pursuant to Robert's Rules of Order,205 because the two members who
abstained did so due to a conflict of interest, their presence should not have
been counted.206  The court held that the Association's adoption of the
"members present" method of tabulating votes was allowed by Robert's, and
was therefore proper.207
In Association ofApartment Owners ofMaalaea Kai, Inc. v. Stillson,2 08 the
Association brought a foreclosure action against the owners for failure to pay
the monthly conversion surcharge after the Association purchased the leased
fee interest. 209 The defendants claimed the measure was not validly passed
based on how the association calculated owner votes.210 Overruling the trial
court, the Hawai'i Supreme Court held that seventy-five percent ownership
approval was statutorily sufficient, 211 and that the Association could rely on the
method of voting specified by their bylaws.2 12 Furthermore, the court found
that even if there had been a defect in procedure, the purchase of the leased fee
interests by over seventy-five percent of the owners in the condominium project
constituted ratification.2 13
199 Id. at 476, 221 P.3d at 454.
200 Id. at 479, 221 P.3d at 457.
201 Id. at 478, 221 P.3d at 456.
202 Id. at 484, 221 P.3d at 462.
203 id
204 id
205 Hawai'i law requires that all association and board of directors meetings shall be
conducted in compliance with the most current edition ofRobert's Rules ofOrder. HAW. REV.
STAT. § 514A-82(a)(16) (Supp. 2010).
206 Alvarez, 121 Haw. at 484, 221 P.3d at 464.
207 id
208 108 Haw. 2, 116 P.3d 644 (2005).
209 Id. at 4, 116 P.3d at 646.
210 Id. at 5-7, 116 P.3d at 647-49.
211 Id. at 7, 116 P.3d at 649. Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 514C-6(a) requires seventy-
five percent approval.
212 Id at 9, 116 P.3d at 651.
213 Id. at 15, 116 P.3d at 657.
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Finally, in Arthur v. Sorensen,2 14 the issue was whether Hawai'i's
Condominium Property Act215 governed a particular transaction. 2 16  The
plaintiffs sold options in a condominium project to defendant buyers, with final
payment due upon issuance of the final public report or a year after execution
of the reservation and sales agreements.2 17 After a final report was issued, the
buyers sought to back out of the transaction, claiming the letter agreement was
invalid.218 The buyers claimed the Condominium Property Act governed the
sale of the options they purchased and that they could escape their obligations
because they entered the agreement before the developer issued its final
report. 2 19 Although the court found the buyers were not bound to perform under
the reservation and sales agreements, they could not rely on the Act to nullify
the letter agreements. 22 0 The clear intent of the Act was to protect prospective
purchasers from "unscrupulous and/or fiscally irresponsible developers by
requiring all deposits to be placed in escrow." 2 2 1 The court found that these
references to "escrow" belied the buyer's argument that they fell within the
protected class because (1) their money was not placed in escrow, and (2) upon
cancellation there would be nothing to return to the buyers since they had
purchased an opportunity rather than actual apartments.m Therefore, any lost
opportunity costs associated with the purchase of the options had to fall upon
the buyers rather than the sellers.223
VII. EASEMENTS
In two cases, the court demonstrated its proclivity for preserving access at the
expense of a landowner's right to exclude.
A. Easements Based on Ancient or Historical Use
The Hawai'i Supreme Court in 2004 addressed easements and kuleana
access rights in Bremer v. Weeks.224 The plaintiff, who owned kuleana land,
claimed a right of way over a portion of a trail owned by defendant. 2 25 The
214 80 Haw. 159, 907 P.2d 745 (1995).
215 HAw. REv. STAT. ch. 514A (Supp. 2010).
216 Arthur, 80 Haw. at 163, 907 P.2d at 749.
217 Id. at 161, 907 P.2d at 747.
218 id.
219 Id. at 163, 907 P.2d at 749.
220 Id. at 166, 907 P.2d at 752.
221 Id. at 166-67, 907 P.2d at 752-53.
222 Id.
223 Id. at 167, 907 P.2d at 753.
224 104 Haw. 43, 85 P.3d 150 (2004).
225 Id. at 48, 85 P.3d at 155.
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plaintiff s claim was based on ancient or historical use under Hawai'i Revised
Statutes section 7-1226 as well as an easement based on necessity, despite
having access via another trail.227
Reversing the lower court, the Hawai'i Supreme Court acknowledged that
"[n]o Hawai'i cases specifically set out the parameters for defining what is
sufficient to constitute 'ancient' or 'historic' use for purposes of establishing a
claim to a right of way under [Hawai'i Revised Statutes section] 7-1 .,,228 The
court rejected the lower court's suggestion that such a "stringent evidentiary
showing" was required. 22 9 Rather than require evidence of "who opened the
trail, when that event took place, under what authority, for whose benefit, the
duration of any use, the cessation of any use and the connection between the
trail and Plaintiff s kuleana in terms of use,"230 the court found that the plaintiff
had raised a genuine issue of material fact as to ancient or historic usage based
in part on a 1908 map showing a horse trail that allegedly represented historical
access. 231 Thus, although the plaintiff did not introduce any evidence regarding
use of the trail by predecessors or others, as was presented in the 1968 case
Palama v. Sheehan,232 the court found that summary judgment was not
appropriate.2 33
The court also found the plaintiffs necessity claim was ripe,234 since the
agreements with the previous owners constituted a mere revocable license.235
According to the court, "a claim of easement by necessity will not be defeated
on the basis that an alternate route to the claimant's land exists where the
claimant does not have a legally enforceable right to use the alternate route."236
B. Undefined Easements
In Clog Holdings, N. V v. Bailey, the owners of ocean cliff property on Maui
subdivided their land and created a pedestrian access easement across one lot in
226 Section 7-1 recognizes Native Hawaiian gathering rights, specifically "the right to take
firewood, house-timber, aho cord, thatch, or ki leaf, from the land on which they live, for their
own private use .... The people shall also have a right to drinking water, and running water,
and the right of way." HAW. REv. STAT. § 7-1 (2009).
227 Bremer, 104 Haw. at 48-49, 85 P.3d at 155-56.
228 Id. at 64, 85 P.3d at 171.
229 Id. at 65, 85 P.3d at 172.
230 Id. (emphases added).
231 Id. at 64-65, 85 P.3d at 171-72.
232 50 Haw. 298, 440 P.2d 95 (1968) (recognizing kuleana landowner access rights).
233 See Bremer, 104 Haw. at 65, 85 P.3d at 172.
234 Id. at 69, 85 P.3d at 176.
235 id.
236 Id. at 67, 85 P.3d at 174.
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favor of two other lots. 237 Their intent was twofold: to create a marketing
strategy to ensure there was beach and ocean access to the other lots, and to
ensure their own access to the beach and ocean should they retain any of their
property.2 3 8 Former Beatle George Harrison ultimately purchased the servient
estate, and, apparently unaware of the encumbrance, built a house within one
hundred feet of the public easement. 239 While his realtor claimed Harrison had
been informed, and the real estate sales contract noted the easement, Harrison's
title insurance indicated the lot was free of any encumbrances and it failed to
appear in the deed.240 Harrison, now with a Maui home considerably less
241private than he expected, challenged the existence of the easement.
The court first found that Harrison had actual notice of the easement based
on the sales contract.24 2 Because there were conflicts in the documents
surrounding the transaction, the court stated that "[i]t was unreasonable to
disregard these discrepancies in the documents simply because a limited title
search failed to reveal the easement. Rather, the discrepancies should have
prompted the escrow company to notify the parties to conduct an in-depth
investigation to ascertain the truth."243 The court also found that the circuit
court erred in finding the description of the easement to be ambiguous. 244 The
court ultimately held that a court can relocate an easement only when the
easement is not located in the grant or reservation.245 Just because Harrison
failed to do his title homework did not constitute grounds upon which the court
could adjust the easement.
VIII. COVENANTS, CONDITIONS, AND RESTRICTIONS
The use of covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CCRs) to control land use
in common interest communities and other developments is standard practice
across the United States.24 6 Restrictive covenants are utilized in most multi-lot
residential projects to control land development, architectural design,
237 92 Haw. 374, 379-80, 992 P.2d 69, 74-75 (2000). Notably, this opinion is of no
precedential value as it was ultimately withdrawn from publication. See id. at 374, 992 P.2d at
69.
238 Id. at 380, 992 P.2d at 75.
239 Id. at 382, 992 P.2d at 77.
240 Id. at 381-82, 992 P.2d at 76-77.
241 Id. at 382, 992 P.2d at 77.
242 Id. at 388, 992 P.2d at 83.
243 id.
244 Id. at 394, 992 P.2d at 89.
245 id.
246 See David L. Callies et al., Ramapo Looking Forward: Gated Communities, Covenants,
and Concerns, 35 URB. LAw. 177, 178 (2003).
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landscaping, height restrictions, and other aspects of land use.247 Perhaps
reflecting this prevalence, the Moon Court considered a number of cases
relating to disputes over the application of CCRs.248 The court generally
resolved ambiguities in favor of the free use of land.
Consistent with the precedent set in 1978 by Collins v. Goetsch249 and
Sandstrom v. Larsen,250 the court continued to consider extrinsic evidence as a
method to interpret ambiguous covenants in Waikiki Malia Hotel, Inc. v. Kinkai
Properties Ltd.251 There, JMK Associates sold a lot in Waikiki, identified as
tax map lot 48, to MNS Ltd. subject to a condition limiting the maximum
building height.2 52 The restrictive covenant, however, did not specifically name
the benefited property and it was not included in the recorded deed. 253 The
Tom family held all of the stock in JMK and the Aina Luana Apartment-Hotel;
the Aina Luana hotel owned tax map lot 269, which was adjacent to lot 48.254
Aina Luana subsequently sold lot 269 to Outrigger Hotels Hawai'i, the operator
of the former Waikiki Malia Hotel (WMH).255 Outrigger later sold lot 269 to
Lucky Hotels U.S.A. Co.256 WMH, as cross-appellant, subsequently attempted
to enforce the height restriction covenant against Kinkai Properties Limited
Partnership, the successor in interest to MNS.257
Faced with ambiguous language regarding the intent of the covenanting
parties, the court evaluated extrinsic evidence of intent in order to determine
that while there was a valid covenant benefiting lot 269 and burdening lot 48,258
at best, WMH was the beneficiary of a covenant in gross, a disfavored type of
covenant in Hawai'i. The court held that WMH could not enforce the covenant
against MNS and lot 48 because it had no interest in the benefitted property,
247 Callies, supra note 1, at 17.
248 See, e.g., Pelosi v. Wailea Ranch Estates, 91 Haw. 478, 985 P.2d 1045 (1999); Hiner v.
Hoffman, 90 Haw. 188, 977 P.2d 878 (1999); Waikiki Malia Hotel, Inc. v. Kinkai Props. Ltd.,
75 Haw. 370, 862 P.2d 1048 (1993).
249 59 Haw. 481, 488 n.3, 583 P.2d 353, 358 n.3 (1978) (comparing appellant's structure to
others in the subdivision, but ultimately finding that this extrinsic evidence did not resolve the
ambiguous covenant).
250 59 Haw. 491, 496, 583 P.2d 971, 976 (1978) (considering the height of other structures
in the subdivision, but finding that this extrinsic evidence did not prove abandonment of the
height covenant).
251 See Waikiki Malia, 75 Haw. 370, 862 P.2d 1048; J. David Breemer, Note, Hiner v.
Hoffman: Strict Construction of a Common Restrictive Covenant, 22 U. HAw. L. REv. 621,
633-34 (2000).
252 Waikiki Malia, 75 Haw. at 376-77, 862 P.2d at 1054-55.
253 Id. at 381 n.3, 862 P.2d at 1056 n.3.
254 Id. at 376, 862 P.2d at 1054.
255 Id. at 376 n.1, 862 P.2d at 1054 n.1.
256 id.
257 Id. at 374-77, 862 P.2d at 1053-54.
258 Id. at 385, 862 P.2d at 1058.
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but also because the facts demonstrated that there was an enforceable covenant
benefitting the nearby hotel parcel, the burden of which Kinkai had already
amicably resolved.2 59
In Hiner v. Hoffman, the court held a covenant restricting building height
unenforceable due to ambiguity in its language. 26 0 The dispute arose when the
Hoffman family purchased a lot in the Pacific Palisades subdivision in Pearl
261City on the island of O'ahu and planned to construct a three-story dwelling.
Each of the 119 lots in the subdivision, including that owned by the Hoffmans,
were burdened by a covenant that provided: "No dwelling shall be erected,
altered, placed[,] or permitted . . . which exceeds two stories in height."26 2
After construction began, the owners of two lots located mauka of the
Hoffmans' lot filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the
Hoffmans' house violated the restrictive covenant.2 63 Despite the pending
litigation and warnings from neighbors and the local homeowners association,
the Hoffinans completed the three-story dwelling.2 64 The circuit court granted
the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and issued a mandatory injunction
requiring the Hoffmans to remove the third story of the dwelling. 2 65
On appeal, Chief Justice Moon, writing for the majority, emphasized that the
intentions of the parties to a covenant "are normally determined from the
language of the deed,"266 but that, as in Waikiki Malia, "substantial doubt or
ambiguity is resolved against the person seeking its enforcement." 26 7 Despite
finding that "the undisputed purpose and intent of . .. [the covenant] is to
restrict the height of a home built on the property" 268 the court found the term
"two stories in height" to be ambiguous on its face and vacated and remanded
the case to the circuit court.26 9 In contrast to the court's willingness to resolve
the ambiguous language of the covenant in Waikiki Malia,2 70 the court in Hiner
declined to resolve the ambiguity in favor of the party seeking enforcement of
the covenant.271
251 Id. at 396, 862 P.2d at 1063.
260 90 Haw. 188, 189, 977 P.2d 878, 879 (1999).
261 Id.
262 id.
263 id.
264 Id.
265 Id. at 190, 977 P.2d at 880.
266 Id. (citing Waikiki Malia Hotel, Inc. v. Kinkai Props. Ltd., 75 Haw. 370, 384, 862 P.2d
1048, 1057 (1993)).
267 id.
268 id
269 Id. at 196, 977 P.2d at 886.
270 75 Haw. at 385, 862 P.2d at 1058.
271 Hiner, 90 Haw. at 189, 977 P.2d at 879.
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Finally, in Pelosi v. Wailea Ranch Estates, the court considered the
272
appropriate remedy for the violation of a restrictive covenant. Pelosi, who
owned Lot 28 of the Maui Meadows Unit III Subdivision, sought to enforce a
covenant that burdened each lot in the subdivision against the parties in interest
to the adjacent Lot 29.273 The subject covenant prohibited the construction of
non-residential structures and limited residential structures to one-and-a-half-
story residential buildings.2 74 Specifically, Pelosi sought damages and a
mandatory injunction to remove the roadway and tennis court built on Lot 29
by developers who had constructed the subject improvements to service a
27
separate subdivision, Wailea Ranch Estates.27 Pelosi also included subdivision
lot owners as Doe defendants in the complaint.2 76 Pelosi argued that under
277Sandstrom, relative hardship to the parties was irrelevant and that an
injunction was mandatory. 278 The court held, however, that balancing the
equities was appropriate because defendant lot owners had not intentionally
breached the covenant.27 9 In balancing the equities, the court found that
removal of the roadway would "entail a gross disproportion" between the harm
to the defendants and the benefit to Pelosi. 280 The court ultimately awarded
damages and an order to remove the tennis court, but permitted the roadway to
281
remain.
IX. NATIVE HAWAIIAN PROPERTY RIGHTS
In contrast to the relatively few opinions addressing Native Hawaiian rights
during the Lum Court,282 the Moon Court considered such rights in a number of
significant cases. These cases, most notably Public Access Shoreline Hawaii v.
Hawai'i County Planning Commission (PASH) ,283 State v. Hanapi,2 84 and Ka
Pa'akai 0 Ka 'Aina v. Land Use Commission,285 generally extend the scope
272 91 Haw. 478, 481, 985 P.2d 1045, 1048 (1999).
273 Id. at 483, 985 P.2d at 1050.
274 Id. at 482, 985 P.2d at 1049.
275 Id. at 481, 985 P.2d at 1048.
276 Id. at 483, 985 P.2d at 1050.
277 See supra note 15.
278 Pelosi, 91 Haw. at 487-88, 985 P.2d at 1055-56.
279 Id. at 488-89, 985 P.2d at 1056-57.
280 Id. at 492, 985 P.2d at 1059.
281 Id. at 494, 985 P.2d at 1061.
282 See Melody K. MacKenzie, TheLum Court andNative Hawaiian Rights, 14 U. HAw. L.
REv. 377 (1992).
283 79 Haw. 425, 903 P.2d 1246 (1995).
284 89 Haw. 177, 970 P.2d 485 (1998).
285 94 Haw. 31, 7 P.3d 1068 (2000).
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and breadth of native Hawaiian traditional and customary rights guaranteed in
article XII, section 7 of the State Constitution as amended in 1978.286
In Public Access Shoreline Hawaii v. Hawai'i County Planning
Commission (PASH), the court addressed several issues, including the standing
287
of Native Hawaiians to intervene in development projects, the obligations of
reviewing authorities under the CZMA, the Hawai'i State Constitution, Hawai'i
common law, and the doctrine of customary rights.2 88 The case arose when
Nansay Hawai'i, Inc. sought an SMA use permit from the Hawai'i County
Planning Commission (HPC) to develop a resort complex.289 PASH, an
unincorporated public interest membership organization, and Angel Pilago, a
private citizen, opposed the project and requested contested case proceedings
before the HPC.29 0 The HPC denied the requested contested case proceedings
to both parties on standing grounds and subsequently issued the SMA use
291permit to Nansay.
The court held that Native Hawaiians who exercise customary rights within
an ahupua'a have interests distinguishable from the general public that afford
them standing to oppose development in that ahupua'a.2 92 Specifically, the
court found that "issues relating to the subsistence, cultural, and religious
practices of [N]ative Hawaiians amount to interests that are clearly
distinguishable from those of the general public[.]" 2 93 The easing of standing
requirements for Native Hawaiians arguably applies to all permits subject to
contested case hearings.
Although barely raised in the briefs of the parties, the court also found that
HPC must protect Native Hawaiian traditional and customary rights "to the
extent [applicable] under the Hawai'i Constitution and relevant statutes" 294 and
then wrote a small treatise on the subject in a spectacular display of judicial
286 "The State reaffirms and shall protect all rights, customarily and traditionally exercised
for subsistence, cultural and religious purposes and possessed by ahupua'a tenants who are
descendants of native Hawaiians who inhabited the Hawaiian Islands prior to 1778, subject to
the right of the State to regulate such rights." HAW. CONST. art. XII, § 7.
287 79 Haw. at 432, 434, 903 P.2d at 1253, 1255. The standing issue was the principle
question before the court. Id.
288 Id. at 434-51, 903 P.2d at 1255-72. The court significantly expanded its review despite
the paucity of treatment by the briefs.
289 Id. at 429, 903 P.2d at 1250.
290 id.
291 Id. PASH and Pilago then brought a case before the circuit court, which remanded to the
HPC with instructions to hold contested case hearings. Id. "[T]he ICA affirmed the circuit
court's order with respect to PASH[, but] reversed it with respect to Pilago." Id. The Hawai'i
Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the ICA's decision.
292 Id. at 434 n.15, 903 P.2d at 1255 n.15.
293 id
294 Id. at 437, 903 P.2d at 1258.
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hubris. The court specifically cited article XII, section 7 of the Hawai'i State
Constitution and Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 1 1.295 The court also
incorporated the traditional and customary rights discussed in Kalipi v.
Hawaiian Trust Co. 2 96 and Pele Defense Fund v. Paty.29 7 The court found that
"[o]ur examination of the relevant legal developments in Hawaiian history
leads us to the conclusion that the western concept of exclusivity is not
universally applicable in Hawai'i." 29 8 PASH firmly established that reviewing
agencies must protect traditional and customary rights as established by the
Hawai'i Constitution, relevant statutes, and case law.
Three years after PASH, the Moon Court again considered traditional and
customary rights in State v. Hanapi2 99 and substantially retreated from some of
its extreme language in PASH. Alapa'i Hanapi, a Native Hawaiian resident of
Moloka'i, was convicted of second degree criminal trespass for attempting to
halt grading on an adjacent lot that featured two fishponds. 300 On appeal,
Hanapi claimed that he had a privilege as a Native Hawaiian to remain lawfully
on the subject property to engage in a constitutionally protected activity.3 0' The
court formulated a three-factor test to determine constitutional protection of
traditional and customary rights, finding that Hanapi did not meet its
requirements 302 that the party seeking constitutional protection must: (1) be a
"[N]ative Hawaiian" as established by PASH, (2) "establish that his or her
claimed right is constitutionally protected as a customary or traditional native
Hawaiian practice[,]" and (3) demonstrate that the exercise of the traditional or
customary right "occurred on undeveloped or 'less than fully developed
property."' 3 03  The court clarified PASH with respect to factor three by
specifying that "if property is deemed 'fully developed,' i.e., lands zoned and
used for residential purposes with existing dwellings, improvements, and
infrastructure, it is always 'inconsistent' to permit the practice of traditional and
customary [N]ative Hawaiian rights on such property." 3  The three-factor test
295 id.
296 66 Haw. 1, 656 P.2d 745 (1982).
297 73 Haw. 578, 837 P.2d 1247 (1992).
298 PASH, 79 Haw. at 447, 903 P.2d at 1268 (citations omitted). This "western concept" is
made applicable to the states by no less an authority than the U.S. Supreme Court: "[WJe hold
that the 'right to exclude,' so universally held to be a fundamental element ofthe property right,
falls within this category of interests that the Government cannot take without compensation."
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979).
299 89 Haw. 177, 970 P.2d 485 (1998).
300 Id. at 178, 970 P.2d at 486.
301 Id. at 182, 970 P.2d at 490.
302 Id. at 184-85, 970 P.2d at 492-93.
303 Id. at 186, 970 P.2d at 494.
3 Id. at 186-87, 970 P.2d at 494-95 (emphasis omitted).
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established by Hanapi continues to control the exercise of traditional and
customary Native Hawaiian rights.
The Moon Court's third significant case dealing directly with Native
Hawaiian traditional and customary rights was Ka Pa 'akai 0 Ka 'Aina v. Land
Use Commission.30 5 The case was a consolidated appeal arising out of the State
of Hawai'i's Land Use Commission's (LUC) grant of a petition to reclassify
approximately 1009 acres of land on the Big Island of Hawai'i from a
conservation district to an urban district. 306 Appellants were a number of civic
307 fisa
associations that opposed the reclassification. In the first application of the
PASH requirements, the court held that in making its administrative findings,
the LUC failed to "protect the reasonable exercise of customarily and
traditionally exercised rights of Hawaiians to the extent feasible."o30 The court
set out the required findings related to Native Hawaiian traditional and
customary rights, which structurally resemble the requirements of the National
Environmental Policy Act.309 While the required findings specified by Ka
Pa'akai 0 Ka 'Aina may aid in protecting Native Hawaiian traditional and
customary rights, applying this requirement to review by the LUC is
problematic. A district boundary amendment does not give rise to a
developmental impact. The findings requirement would be better suited to
project specific permitting review at the county level. What is clear, however,
is that Ka Pa 'akai 0 Ka 'A ina is consistent with the Moon court's expansion of
traditional and customary Native Hawaiian rights.
X. CONCLUSION
In sum, the Moon Court has made many useful contributions to the law of
property in Hawai'i. It has taken care to preserve the rights of landowners to
freely use property in the face of private restrictive covenants limiting that use
if such covenants are the least bit vague or poorly defined. It has amplified and
extended basic principles in the areas of coastal zone management,
305 94 Haw. 31, 7 P.3d 1068 (2000).
306 Id. at 34, 7 P.3d at 1071.
307 Id.
30s Id. at 53, 7 P.3d at 1090 (citing Pub. Access Shoreline Haw. v. Hawai'i Cnty. Planning
Comm'n (PASH), 79 Haw. 425, 450 n.43, 903 P.2d 1246, 1271 n.43 (1995)).
309 Id. The requirements include
(1) the identity and scope of "valued cultural, historical, or natural resources" in the
petition area, including the extent to which traditional and customary [N]ative Hawaiian
rights are exercised in the petition area; (2) the extent to which those resources-
including traditional and customary [N]ative Hawaiian rights-will be affected or
impaired by the proposed action; and (3) the feasible action, if any, to be taken by the
LUC to reasonably protect [NJative Hawaiian rights if they are found to exist.
Id.
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condominium, easement, and leasehold law. Its record on preserving private
property rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution's Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments in the face of regulatory challenges is, on the other hand,
appalling, particularly given the increasing emphasis on preserving such rights
in our nation's highest court. In case after case, the Moon Court has strained to
apply general and often vague goals pursued by select interest groups and
factions regardless of statutory law to the contrary. The result, coupled with
Hawai'i's increasingly well-known penchant for lengthy, often decade-long
land use permitting processes, is a climate that increasingly discourages both
local and foreign investment in land development, because it is widely
perceived as too risky for the private sector to undertake. In particular, the
effect on the availability of housing that is affordable at any but the most
astronomical levels has been great. In short, the Moon Court has made a
considerable negative impression on the land development aspect of property
law, virtually converting the use of land into a privilege rather than a
constitutional right subject only to regulation for the health, safety and welfare
of all. Whether that impression becomes indelible is a matter that the
Recktenwald Court should address at the earliest opportunity.
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